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Acquired equivalence is a paradigm in which generalization is increased between two superficially
dissimilar stimuli (or antecedents) that have previously been associated with similar outcomes (or
consequents). Several possible mechanisms have been proposed, including changes in stimulus
representations, either in the form of added associations or a change of feature salience. A different way
of conceptualizing acquired equivalence is in terms of strategic inference: Confronted with a choice on
which it has no evidence, the organism may infer from its history of reinforcement what the best option
is, and that inference is observed as acquired equivalence. To test this account, we combined an
incremental learning task with an episodic memory test. Drawings of faces were made equivalent
through acquired equivalence training, and then paired with words in a list learning paradigm. When
participants were asked to recognize specific face-word pairings, they confused faces more often when
they had been made equivalent. This suggests that prior acquired equivalence training does influence
how memories are coded. We also tested whether this change in coding reflected acquisition of new
associations, as suggested by the associative mediation account, or whether stimuli become more similar
through a reweighting of stimulus features, as assumed by some categorization theories. Results
supported the associative mediation view. We discuss similarities between this view and exemplar
theories of categorization performance.
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_______________________________________________________________________________
In an acquired equivalence task, an organ-
ism learns that two or more stimuli are
equivalent in terms of being mapped onto
the same outcomes or responses. This is
referred to as functional equivalence, as the
grouping of stimuli is not based on stimulus
characteristics, but only on a functional
characteristic such as predicting the same
outcome. In a typical experiment, two ante-
cedent stimuli, A1 and A2, are first both
followed by a reward, while another anteced-
ent stimulus, B, is not. When, in a second
transfer stage, A1 is paired with a shock, the
conditioned fear will generalize from A1 to A2,
and not to B (Ward-Robinson & Hall, 1999,
Expt. 2). It is as if A1 and A2 have become
equivalent to the animal because they predict-
ed the same outcome (or consequent) in the
first stage of the experiment; subsequent
learning about A1 then transfers easily to A2.
Functional equivalence is interesting in its own
right, but it has also been studied as a way in
which humans and nonhuman animals learn
to categorize (Urcuioli, 2001), and has been
suggested to underlie the learning of symbolic
reference (Sidman, 1994; Tonneau, 2001).
Although often studied in animal learning
paradigms (e.g., Bonardi, Rey, Richmond, &
Hall, 1993; Honey & Hall, 1989, 1991),
functional equivalence can also be found in
humans using, for example, the ‘Fish’ task
(Myers et al., 2003). On each trial of the ‘Fish’
task, participants see a face and a pair of fish,
and have to learn through trial and error
which of the fish goes with that face (Fig-
ure 1). There are four faces (A1, A2, B1, B2),
referred to as antecedents, and four possible
fish (X1, X2, Y1, Y2), referred to as conse-
quents (more common terminology in the
behavior-analytic literature is ‘sample stimuli’
and ‘comparison stimuli’, respectively). In the
initial training stages participants learn that,
given face A1 or A2, the correct answer is to
choose fish X1 over fish Y1; given face B1 or
B2, the correct answer is to choose fish Y1 over
fish X1. During this phase, participants learn
that face A1 and A2 are equivalent with respect
to the associated fish; face B1 and B2 are
likewise equivalent. Next, participants learn a
new set of pairs: Given face A1, choose fish X2
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over Y2, and given face B1, choose fish Y2 over
X2. Participants are then given a transfer test:
Given face A2 or B2, will subjects choose fish
X2 or Y2? Having learned that faces A1 and A2
are equivalent, participants may generalize
from learning that A1 goes with Y1 to that A2
also goes with X2; the same holds for B2
(equivalent to B1) and Y2 (associated with B1).
Healthy adults (Hall, Mitchell, Graham, &
Lavis, 2003; Myers et al., 2003), children
(Goyos, 2000; Schenk, 1994) and retarded
individuals (Dube, McIlvane, Maguire,
Mackay, & Stoddard, 1989) all reliably make
this type of generalization. Similar behavior
can be observed in nonhuman species includ-
ing rats and pigeons (e.g., Bonardi et al., 1993;
Honey & Hall, 1991; Urcuioli, 2001).
In the behavior-analytic literature, function-
al equivalence is interpreted as equivalence
training grouping stimuli into equivalence
classes based on common reinforced choices
(e.g., Sidman & Tailby, 1982; Tonneau, 2001).
By virtue of pairing with outcomes, anteced-
ents A1 and A2 are altered to form one
equivalence class, while B1 and B2 form another.
When confronted with a new, untrained
choice in the transfer test, training with other
class members may generalize to this new
choice. For example, when two stimuli, A1 and
A2, are paired with the same outcome (e.g.,
X1), and A1 is subsequently paired with
another outcome (X2), this training will
generalize to the other member of the
equivalence class. Generalization between
stimuli within an equivalence class is en-
hanced, while generalization between stimuli
in different equivalence classes is reduced.
The underlying process is often referred to as
transfer of function from A1 to A2. Equivalence
classes can come about not only by common
reinforced choices, but also when members of
a class share a common reinforcer (e.g. Dube
et al., 1989). Antecedents and consequents
also readily form equivalence classes (Mark-
ham, Dougher, & Augustson, 2002), as may
stimuli and the responses that must be given to
them (though see Urcuioli, Lionello-DeNolf,
Michalek, & Vasconcelos, 2006, for contrary
evidence with pigeons).
At a cognitive level, there are two ways to
understand equivalence classes. On the one
hand, generalization within them may reflect a
strategic inference. Since organisms do not have
any evidence to base their choice on in
transfer tests, they may assume that it is most
advantageous to base their choice on training
with other class members. In the example
given above, they may infer that, in the
absence of better evidence, A2 is more likely
than not to require a choice of X2, given that
A1 requires a choice of X2.
Alternatively, members of an equivalence
class may be stored in memory in a way that
increases generalization between them. In-
Fig. 1. Example screen events during one trial. (A) Stimuli appear. (B) Participant responds and corrective feedback
is given.
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deed, many explanations for acquired equiva-
lence are based on the idea that, during initial
training, the representations of stimuli paired
with the same outcome or consequent are
modified to increase subsequent generaliza-
tion between them (e.g., Gluck & Myers, 2001;
Hall et al., 2003; Myers & Gluck, 1996).
Conversely, representations of stimuli that
are associated with different outcomes should
become less alike.
Two mechanisms have been proposed to
underlie such representational change. One
hypothesis is that representations of equivalent
stimuli become more similar because overlap-
ping features become more salient. In the fish
task, faces have three salient features (age,
gender, hair color), of which equivalent faces
share one (the specific shared feature is
counterbalanced over participants). For exam-
ple, suppose that two faces with yellow hair are
paired with the same consequent, while two
brown-haired faces, paired with a different
consequent, form a second equivalence class.
Equivalence training might make hair color
more salient, emphasizing the differences
between equivalence classes, while deempha-
sizing other features (gender and age) that
vary within an equivalence class. This would
result in antecedents within one equivalence
class being perceived as more similar to each
other, and less similar to antecedents from
other equivalence classes. Hypotheses of this
kind, which emphasize selective attention to
one or more features that control responding,
have been proposed by theories of animal
learning (Mackintosh, 1975), have received
experimental support (e.g., Foree & Lo-
Lordo, 1970; Mackintosh, 1965; Reynolds,
1961), and are common currency in the field
of categorization (Kruschke, 1979, 1992;
Medin & Schaffer, 1978). Indeed, acquired
equivalence tasks are similar to categorization
tasks in that stimuli are grouped into classes
according to the outcome or response they
evoke. In many acquired equivalence studies
with human participants, the first stage of
training also uses verbal labels, making it
equivalent to a categorization task (e.g.,
participants may be asked to discover that
one verbal label applies to A1 and A2, and
another to B1 and B2).
This hypothesis, which we will call the feature
salience account of acquired equivalence, is
intuitively appealing. If, for example, hair
color can be used to remember which choice
to make in the presence of which face, it seems
natural to suggest that participants use hair
color to code the faces when remembering the
choices to be made.
An alternative hypothesis was presented by
Hall and colleagues (Hall et al., 2003; Ward-
Robinson & Hall, 1999), building on earlier
ideas by Hull (1939). They propose that
acquired equivalence training adds an associ-
ation to stimulus representations. Retrieval of
this association later in training then leads to
the transfer. In the Fish paradigm, participants
might first learn to associate faces A1 and A2
with fish X1. In a later phase, participants are
trained to pair face A1 with fish X2. During
that training, the previously learned associa-
tion of face A1 and fish X1 will be activated,
leading fish X1 and X2 to become associated,
by virtue of their pairing with the same
consequent. When face A2 is now shown, it
will activate its prior association with X1, which
in turn activates X2; thus, the participant will
choose X2 in the presence of A2.
Hall et al. (2003) found evidence for this
associative mediation account of acquired equiv-
alence. In one experiment, they linked stimuli
A1 and A2 to color patches (e.g., a square in a
distinct red color). They found that when A1
was coupled with a response in a second
training stage, this generalized not only to A2
but also to the color patch. This is what would
be expected by the associative mediation
account, namely: Generalization can occur
between consequents that had previously been
paired with the same antecedent. However, the
same research group also found evidence for
the feature salience account. In an acquired
equivalence task, participants learned about
four antecedents: two snowflake patterns and
two color patches. These were paired with
consequents so as to form equivalence classes
that either shared a clear feature (two snow-
flake patterns in one class, two color patches in
the other) or did not (one snowflake and color
patch in each class). As would be predicted by
the feature salience account, the equivalence
training had a much stronger effect on later
generalization when the equivalent anteced-
ents shared a clear feature than when they did
not (Bonardi, Graham, & Hall, 2005). The
experiment was set up in such a way that
associative mediation was excluded as an
explanation for these results.
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In the studies reported here, we first sought
to clarify whether acquired equivalence train-
ing would lead to responses that could not be
based on strategic inferences (Experiment 1).
If representations are indeed being changed
during training, this should also show when
they are probed in different ways, such as in an
explicit memory test. In particular, if repre-
sentations of two stimuli have become more
similar through equivalence training, then
they should also become more confusable in
episodic memory. We tested this by combining
equivalence training with an episodic associa-
tive recognition task. If acquired equivalence
changes representations, participants should
make more errors on items trained for
equivalence (critical lures) than on items that
had not been trained for equivalence (control
lures). If, on the other hand, acquired
equivalence relies on inferences and not on
representational change, then performance
on the episodic memory test should not be
impacted by acquired equivalence. This is so
because in the associative recognition task, a
response based on the equivalence of stimuli is
an error. Since participants have no incentive
to make an error, they have no incentive to
infer responses from the equivalence training.
This contrasts with traditional tests of transfer
of function, in which responses based on
equivalence training are never predefined as
errors; either no information is given about
which answers are correct, or participants
receive feedback only after giving the re-
sponse. In such contexts, responding on the
basis of experience with other members of an
equivalence class could be argued to be a
rational strategy.
Next (Experiment 2), we reversed the order
of equivalence training and episodic memory
task, to determine whether the effects of
acquired equivalence resided at training or
testing. To preview results, Experiment 1
showed that acquired equivalence training
could indeed influence performance in an
episodic memory test, while Experiment 2
showed that the effects occur during training,
not testing.
Having obtained support for a representa-
tional account of acquired equivalence, we
wanted to contrast the two possible mecha-
nisms for representational change (feature
salience vs. associative mediation) in a design
in which the two accounts would lead to
opposite predictions (Experiment 3). Results
were consistent with the associative mediation
account, rather than the feature salience
account.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 tested whether equivalence
training altered stimulus representations, by
combining equivalence training with an epi-
sodic memory task (see Figure 2). Participants
underwent acquired equivalence training on
fish–face pairs, and were then given a gener-
alization test. They then studied words in the
presence of the previously trained face ante-
cedents. Participants were only instructed to
study the words, but were subsequently tested
on their recognition of the word–face pairings
(associative recognition). Finally, the face–fish
generalization test was repeated to document
that face–word training had not disrupted the
equivalencies learned earlier.
During the recognition test, participants
were confronted with studied word–face pairs
as well as with two kinds of lures: critical lures in
which a word that had been studied with one
face was now shown with an equivalent face
(e.g., a word that had been paired with face A1
at training was shown at test with equivalent
face A2), and control lures in which the face at
test was not equivalent to the face at study
(e.g., a word combined with face A1 at training
was shown at test with nonequivalent face B1).
If acquired equivalence changes representa-
tions that are also involved in episodic
memory, then participants should make more
errors on critical lures than on control lures.
If, on the other hand, acquired equivalence
relies on inferences and not on representa-
tional change, no such difference should be
found.
METHOD
Subjects
Participants were 34 students at Rutgers
University, who received class credit in an
introductory psychology class in exchange for
their participation. Twenty participants were
female and 14 male; mean age was 19 years
(range 17–27). For 2 participants, data from
the second transfer test were lost due to
computer failure; data from all previous stages
were analyzed for these participants. All
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participants signed statements of informed
consent before the initiation of any behavioral
testing, and research procedures conformed
to the regulations established by the Federal
Government and by Rutgers University.
Apparatus and Stimuli
Behavioral testing was automated on a
computer. The participant was seated at a
comfortable viewing distance from the screen
(approximately 700 mm). The keyboard was
masked except for two keys, labeled ‘‘LEFT’’
and ‘‘RIGHT’’, which the participant could
press to record a response.
Four drawings of faces (man, woman, girl,
boy) served as the antecedent stimuli. The boy
and woman had yellow hair while the girl and
man had brown hair. Thus, each antecedent
had three obvious, binary-valued features: age
(adult vs. child), gender (male vs. female) and
hair color (yellow vs. brown); each antecedent
shared exactly one feature with each other
antecedent. For each participant, the four face
drawings were randomly assigned to be ante-
cedents A1, A2, B1, and B2. For each
participant, drawings of a fish colored red,
blue, green, and yellow were randomly as-
signed to X1, X2, Y1, and Y2. Faces and fish
appeared about 3 cm high on the computer
screen.
For face–word pairing, the 16 words used
were: pencil, farmer, curtain, house, parent,
garden, turkey, mountain, river, bell, coffee,
nose, hat, school, moon, drum. Four words were
paired with each antecedent, with face–word
assignment randomized across subjects. Words
were presented on the screen in black lowercase
font (Arial, 24-point), about 1 cm high.
Procedure
At the start of the experiment, on-screen
instructions stated: ‘‘You will see drawings of
Fig. 2. Stages of Experiment 1. In the first three stages, participants learn via trial and error which faces ‘‘have’’
which fish (shown is one set of face–fish pairings, but these were different for each participant). In transfer tests (stages
4–7), acquired equivalence is tested by letting participants decide on unseen face–fish pairings without receiving
feedback. In the face–word study, faces are paired with words. Memory for these pairings is subsequently tested in an
associate recognition test. In this test, the words can either be shown with the face that they were paired with in the study
stage, with a face that is equivalent to the on it was paired with (left pair, a critical lure), or with a face that was not made
equivalent (right pair, a control lure).
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people who each have some pet fish. Different
people have different kinds of fish. Your job is
to learn which kinds of fish each person has.
At first, you will have to guess.’’ The experi-
menter read these instructions aloud to the
participant.
In all, the experiment consisted of seven
stages (Figure 2). Stages 1–4 were the same as
previously described in Myers et al. (2003).
The first three stages were face–fish training.
On each trial, the screen showed a single
antecedent (face), two consequents (fish)
presented side-by-side in randomized left–
right order, and a prompt: ‘‘Which fish does
this person have? Use the LEFT or RIGHT key
to choose.’’ An example of screen appearance
at the start of a trial is shown in Figure 1. The
participant responded by pressing one of the
two labeled keys. The selected consequent
(fish) was circled, and corrective feedback was
given. The stimuli remained on the screen
until the participant responded; feedback was
shown for 1 s, and there was a 1-s intertrial
interval, during which the screen was blank.
There were three stages of training, each
with increasing numbers of trial types as shown
in Figure 2. In the first shaping stage, trials
presented one of two faces (A1 or B1) and a
pair of fish (X1 and Y1), and the participant
learned to pair the correct fish with each face
(A1 with X1 and B1 with Y1). Since the fish
could appear in either left–right order, this
made four trial types in Stage 1 (A1 with X1,
Y1; A1 with Y1, X1; B1 with X1,Y1; B1 with
Y1,X1). A block of trials in Stage 1 consisted of
one of each of these four trial types, in
pseudorandom order. Shaping continued for
a maximum of eight blocks (32 trials) or
terminated early if the participant made eight
consecutive correct responses.
The second equivalence training stage then
began, without warning to the participant. In
equivalence training, the previously learned
trial types were intermixed with trials on which
one of two new faces (A2 or B2) was presented
with the familiar fish (X1 and Y1). Since,
again, the fish could appear in either left–right
order, there were eight trial types, four old and
four new. Each block consisted of eight trials,
one with each trial type, in pseudorandom
order. Equivalence training continued until
the participant reached a criterion of eight
consecutive correct responses, or for a maxi-
mum of eight blocks (64 trials). The third
‘‘new consequents’’ stage then began, without
warning to the participant. Here, on each trial,
a familiar face (A1 or B1) was presented with
two new fish (X2 and Y2). Again, the fish could
appear in either left–right ordering, and these
new trial types were interleaved with the
previously trained ones; thus, there were 12
trial types in each block. Training with new
consequents continued until the participant
made 12 consecutive correct responses or until
a maximum of eight blocks (96 trials) had
been completed.
At the conclusion of training, the following
instructions appeared: ‘‘Good! In this part of
the experiment, you will need to remember
what you have learned so far. You will NOT be
shown the correct answers. At the end of the
experiment, the computer will tell you how
many you got right. Good luck!’’ A transfer test
(stage 4) followed, which consisted of 16 trials:
all 6 trial types from the acquisition stages plus
the 2 new test trial types (A2 paired with X2 or
Y2, and B2 paired with X2 or Y2), with the
consequents in each possible left–right order-
ing. On each trial, the screen showed one face
and two fish; the fish chosen by the participant
was circled, but no corrective feedback was
given. Trial order was random for each
participant.
In the fifth face–word study stage, partici-
pants were instructed to study words. On each
trial, a single face (A1, B1, A2, or B2) appeared
in its usual position, with a single word
underneath. Each pairing was shown for 5 s.
Since each face was paired with four words
total, there were 16 trial types. Face–word
pairings included two passes through a block
of 16 trial types, with order randomized within
a block, for a total of 32 trials. Participants
were instructed to study the words for a later
‘‘memory test’’, and were not given instruc-
tions on how to process the faces.
The sixth stage was an associative recogni-
tion test, containing 16 trials—one with each
of the 16 studied words. Each word appeared
with one of the four face stimuli, and
participants were asked whether that particular
face–word pairing had occurred during study.
On eight of the trials, the word–face pair had
indeed been presented during training; errors
here were misses. On the other eight trials, a
word appeared together with a face with which
it had not previously been paired; errors here
were false positives. On four of these, the word
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appeared paired with a face that had been
made equivalent with the face presented
during study; these were critical lures. On the
other four trials, words were paired with
nonequivalent faces; these pairs were control
lures.
The final stage was a second transfer test,
identical to the first one. It was intended as a
posttest to confirm that learning the word–
face pairs had not disrupted the original face–
fish associations.
RESULTS
All participants learned all trained face–fish
pairs within the maximum allowable number
of trials. Table 1 shows the results from the
transfer tests. To make errors amenable to
standard parametric tests, we transformed
error proportions to a form suitable for
analyses of variance1 (Winer, Brown, & Mi-
chels, 1991). In both transfer tests, very few
errors were made on the trained pairs. There
were more errors on the transfer pairs than on
the old pairs in the first transfer test (two-
tailed paired-samples t-test, t(34) 5 2.78, p ,
.01), but many fewer than the 50% that would
be expected by chance, t(34) 5 6.34, p ,. 001
one-tailed. On the final transfer test, there
were again many fewer errors than could be
expected by chance, t(31) 5 11.3, p , .001
one-tailed. There was no difference between
old and new pairs, t , 1, due to slightly fewer
errors on the new pairs in the final transfer test
and slightly more errors on the old pairs,
although neither difference was significant
(first vs. final test for old pairs: t(31) 5 1.01,
p 5 .32; for new pairs: t(31) 5 1.6, p 5 .12,
both two-tailed). Both transfer tests show a
standard acquired equivalence effect, while
the second test confirms that the learned
equivalencies were maintained during the
episodic learning and test stages.
Figure 3 shows the results from the recog-
nition memory test (sixth stage). Consistent
Table 1
Results from the two transfer tests in Experiment 1 (stage 4
and stage 7) and the one transfer test in Experiment 2.
Expt 1
1st test 2nd test Expt 2
old pairs 0.02 0.03 0.03
transfer pairs 0.15 0.08 0.16
Note. ‘‘Old pairs’’ refers to the face–fish pairings trained
in stages 3–4. ‘‘Transfer pairs’’ refers to the pairings in
which a face and a fish are paired that did not occur in the
stages 3–4. Shown is the proportion of errors on the 16
trials of the transfer tests.
Fig. 3. Error rates in the episodic memory test in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Participants had to judge whether
words and faces had been shown together at study. Dashed bars give the number of intact pairs erroneously labeled as
new (‘‘misses’’). ‘‘Control lures’’ are word–face pairings in which the face is nonequivalent to the face shown with the
word at study. ‘‘Critical lures’’ are word–face pairings in which the face was made equivalent during equivalence training
to the face shown with the word at study. Error bars give 1 SEM.
1 x 5 2 arcsin !(p + 1/2n), where x is the transformed
variable, p is the proportion, and n is the number of
observations underlying the proportion.
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with our hypothesis, participants made more
errors on critical lures than on control lures,
t(33) 5 2.05, p 5 .024 one-tailed). Eleven
subjects made only critical lure errors, while
just 2 made only control lure errors and 6
made both kinds of errors.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 show that
acquired equivalence may alter performance
on an episodic memory test. Our explanation
for this is that equivalence training alters the
representations of stimuli, which in turn
increases generalization between these stimuli
when they are subsequently invoked during
face–word training. These representational
changes should increase similarity between
stimuli within an equivalence class, while
decreasing similarity between stimuli in differ-
ent equivalence classes. These representation-
al differences may then lead to the increased
confusability we found for equivalent stimuli as
compared to nonequivalent stimuli.
The results cannot be explained in terms of
strategic inferences. The participants did not
have a strategic incentive to respond on the
basis of equivalence classes, as such responses
were errors in the task. Even if they had
guessed that they would be tested on word–
face pairings, they would have had an incen-
tive to code what makes the faces distinctive,
not what makes them similar to one another.
The results thus seem to support an explana-
tion of acquired equivalence in terms of
changed representations.
EXPERIMENT 2
The results of Experiment 1 suggest that
equivalence training alters the representations
of antecedent stimuli paired with the same
consequent, and that these altered represen-
tations affect subsequent episodic learning
about those stimuli. It is possible, however,
that the effect resides not at acquisition, but at
retrieval. It may be that the acquired equiva-
lence training changes the ways in which the
faces are used as cues in the recognition test.
To test for this possibility, we performed a
second experiment where the word–face train-
ing preceded the acquired equivalence train-
ing; the episodic memory test still followed the
acquired equivalence training. If acquired
equivalence training changes the way episodic
memories are coded, it should not affect
performance on episodic memories acquired
before the equivalence training. If, on the
other hand, acquired equivalence training
changes the way cues are used at test, we
should replicate the findings of Experiment 1.
METHOD
Participants were 31 students at Rutgers
University, who, as in Experiment 1, received
class credit for their participation; 15 were
female, and 16 male; mean age was 19 years
(range 18–24). All participants signed state-
ments of informed consent before the initia-
tion of any behavioral testing. All research
procedures conformed to the regulations
established by the Federal Government and
by Rutgers University.
Stimuli and stages of Experiment 2 were the
same as in Experiment 1, but the ordering of
the stages was changed. The face–word pair-
ings study stage (fifth stage of Experiment 1)
now came first, and thus preceded the
acquired equivalence training and the transfer
test (Stages 1–4). The recognition test fol-
lowed the transfer test. There was no final
transfer test as in Experiment 1.
RESULTS
As in Experiment 1, all participants learned
all face–fish pairs within the maximum allow-
able number of trials. Table 1 shows the results
from the transfer test. We again transformed
error proportions to make them amenable to
standard parametric tests. Very few errors were
made on the trained pairs. There were more
errors on the transfer pairs than on the old
pairs, t(30) 5 2.44, p 5 .02 two-tailed, but
many fewer than the 50% that would be
expected by chance, t(30) 5 6.44, p , .001
one-tailed. The magnitude of acquired equiv-
alence was similar to that obtained in Exper-
iment 1.
Figure 3 shows the results from the recog-
nition memory test. There were more errors
on both studied words and lures than in
Experiment 1, which is unsurprising given
the longer interval between study and test.
More importantly, participants did not make
more errors on critical lures than on other
rearranged words, one-tailed, t , 1. Just 3
subjects made only critical lure errors, with 6
making only control lure errors and 9 made
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both kinds of errors. Thus, the effect of
acquired equivalence on episodic memory
obtained in Experiment 1 was abolished if
the word–face training preceded the equiva-
lence training.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 showed that equivalence
training could influence episodic memory
involving the same stimuli, by increasing
confusability among stimuli that had previous-
ly been associated with the same consequent.
This effect is in a sense a memory distortion, as
increased similarity led to more responses that
are defined as errors by the task. Other forms
of distortion are false memory effects such as
those in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott para-
digm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). In this
paradigm, a list of words is learned that are all
related to one critical lure. At test, participants
tend to recall or recognize the lure as seen,
even though it was itself not presented.
Accounts based on both learning and retrieval
have been proposed, but recent evidence
suggests that all or part of the effect resides
at the retrieval stage: At test, the lure activates
memories of list items, and is therefore
mistaken for one (Zeelenberg, Boot, & Pecher,
in press). Experiment 2 seems to rule out such
retrieval-based accounts for our results, as we
did not find any effect of equivalence training
on recognition performance when the training
occurred after encoding but before retrieval.
This suggests that equivalence training chang-
es the representations of the equivalent
stimuli, which in turn influences how the
stimuli are processed during episodic encod-
ing.
A confounding factor in the comparison
between Experiments 1 and 2 is that the delay
between episodic study and test was greater in
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1, and that
participants therefore made more errors in
Experiment 2. It is conceivable that this
somehow affected the difference between
control and critical lures. However, forgetting
swiftly results in the confusion of similar
stimuli, whereas discriminations between more
distinct stimuli are relatively robust against
forgetting (e.g., Kraemer, 1984). The differ-
ence in performance on the more similar
critical lures and the more dissimilar control
lures would thus be more likely to grow with
time than to shrink.
From a behavioral perspective, there is no
reason to expect that reversal of the order of
episodic study and equivalence training would
result in different performance. Urcuioli
(2001) performed a traditional acquired
equivalence task in pigeons, but placed the
equivalence training after training with new
consequents. He found that this reordering
did not affect transfer of function in a transfer
test. Also, both Dube et al. (1989) and Goyos
(2000) found that training subjects to reassign
stimuli to a different equivalence class could
change how training with new consequents was
applied to those reassigned stimuli. Equiva-
lence training can thus affect already stored
associations. That it did not in this experiment
strengthens our interpretation that the effect
of equivalence training on episodic memory
performance resides at study, not at test.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiments 1 and 2 together provide
converging evidence that acquired equiva-
lence does involve change in stimulus repre-
sentations. There are two viable accounts of
what form this representational change might
take. The feature-salience account suggests
that features that differ between equivalence
classes are emphasized (made more salient),
making representations of equivalent stimuli
more similar. The associative-mediation ac-
count suggests that the important change
occurs in associations between consequents.
Experiment 3 was designed to test these two
accounts.
Consider the case in which one feature, say
hair color, determines which faces are equiv-
alent in the fish task: Yellow-haired faces are
associated with X1 and brown-haired faces
with X2. What would happen if the hair color
of one of the faces were switched? The feature-
salience account would predict that partici-
pants would reassign this face to a different
equivalence class, as hair color is the feature
that determines antecedent equivalence. The
associative-mediation account would predict
the contrary: As long as the face remains
recognizable, it should continue to evoke the
same response as before.
Another case in which the two accounts
make opposing predictions is when a new
antecedent is introduced. The feature-salience
account would predict that new antecedents
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should be automatically assigned to an equiv-
alence class based on their features. For
example, if hair color is the salient feature, a
new face with yellow hair should elicit the
same responses as other yellow-haired faces. In
contrast, the associative-mediation account
would assign no special meaning to a single
feature, such as hair color; instead, the new
face should either be randomly associated with
a consequent (as participants simply guess to
which class it might belong) or else should be
assigned to the class containing stimuli with
which it shares the most features overall.
In Experiment 3, we simplified the Fish task
to only the shaping and equivalence-training
stages. In the experimental condition, equiva-
lence classes were based on hair color (so that
yellow-haired faces were mapped to conse-
quent X1, while brown-haired faces were
mapped to consequent Y1). This was because
hair color is the only feature that can be
changed without changing the identity of the
face. Hair color is not a weak feature, however,
in that participants learn the equivalence task
as readily if the grouping is based on hair color
as when it is based on a different feature. All
learned associations were tested in a third
stage, followed by testing on a previously
trained face with a hair color change, as well
as testing with a new face entirely. In the
control condition, equivalence classes were
based on age (adult vs. child) or gender (male
vs. female) but not hair color, followed by the
same transfer test of a previously trained face
with a hair color change (see Figure 4 for
design and predictions).
Both the feature-salience and mediated-
associations accounts predict that, in the
control condition, the hair color change will
be ignored, and the face should be mapped as
previously. In the experimental condition,
however, predictions differ. According to the
feature-salience account, a hair color change
should lead the face to be classified with other
faces that have the same hair color; according
to the associative-mediation account, the face
should be identified as it always was, regardless
of a single new feature (hair color).
METHOD
Participants were 40 students at Rutgers
University, who received class credit in an
introductory psychology class in exchange for
their participation. Six participants were male,
and 34 were female; mean age was 19 years
(range 17–31). All participants signed state-
ments of informed consent before the initia-
tion of any behavioral testing, and research
procedures conformed to the regulations
established by the Federal Government and
by Rutgers University. Participants were ran-
domly and evenly assigned to the experimental
and control conditions.
Procedurally, the shaping and equivalence
training stages were similar to Experiment 1:
On each trial, one of the antecedent faces was
presented together with two possible conse-
quent fish stimuli. The ‘‘new consequents’’
stage was omitted. The last phase was a no-
feedback phase to test learning of face–fish
associations.
Four additional drawings were constructed
from the usual faces by switching hair color
(see Figure 4). There were two conditions in
the experiment. In the experimental condi-
tion, assignment of the face drawings to
equivalence classes during Stages 1 and 2 was
based on hair color; i.e., the yellow-haired
woman (A1) and yellow-haired boy (A2) were
associated with consequent X1, while the
brown-haired girl (B1) and brown-haired
man (B2) were associated with consequent
Y1. The other features (gender and age) varied
across and within equivalence classes. These
antecedents and consequents were trained in
Stages 1 and 2, exactly as in the previous
experiments. In the transfer test trained pairs
(A1–X1, B1–Y1) were tested, as well as
presenting a new face: a brown-haired boy
that could be paired with either X1 or Y1.
In the control condition, for half the
participants, equivalence class was based on
gender: the brown-haired girl (A1) and yellow-
haired woman (A2) mapped to X1; the yellow-
haired boy (B1) and yellow-haired man (B2)
mapped to Y1. For the other half of partici-
pants in the control condition, equivalence
class was based on age (adults vs. children):
yellow-haired woman (A1) and yellow-haired
man (A2) mapped to X1; brown-haired boy
(B1) and yellow-haired girl (B2) mapped to
Y1. Equivalence training was followed by the
testing of the trained pairs (A1–X1 and B1–Y1)
as well as a new face. For participants trained
on gender, this was a brown-haired man who,
according to both accounts, should be
mapped to Y1 like the previously trained
yellow-haired man. For those trained on age,
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it was a brown-haired woman who should be
mapped to X1, like the other adults. The
control condition was designed to test whether
hair color was an overwhelmingly salient
feature, in which case the new faces should
be mapped to the opposite consequents like
the only other antecedent with the same hair
color.
For all subjects, the transfer test consisted of
one presentation of each of the three trial types,
with the fish in each possible left–right order,
for a total of six trials. Trials were presented in
randomized order for each subject.
RESULTS
Within the control condition, no difference
between participants in the age and gender
subgroups could be found; data from these
subgroups were therefore combined. Errors
were transformed as in the previous experi-
ments. There was no difference between the
conditions on the number of errors in the first
or second stage of training, t(38) , 1, nor on
the errors made on the ‘‘old’’ faces in the
transfer test [mean number of errors 5 .15
and .30 for the experimental and control
conditions respectively; t(38) , 1]. In other
words, participants in the control and exper-
imental conditions were equally able to learn
and retain equivalencies based on hair color as
on age or gender.
Because of the few trials involved, responses
to the changed face stimuli were analyzed as
follows. Responses could either be based on
Fig. 4. Design of Experiment 3, and predictions of the two accounts. In the first two stages (Training), participants
learn via trial and error which faces ‘‘have’’ which fish (shown is one set of face–fish pairings, but these were different for
each participant). In the experimental condition, equivalence is based on hair color of the face stimuli, while in the
control condition it is based on either gender or age. In stage 3 (Test), participants must decide on face–fish pairings
without receiving feedback. Given in the lower part of the figure are the responses as predicted by the feature-salience
account, the associative-mediation (assoc.) account, and the idea that hair color is a feature that dominates responding
independent of what equivalence training was given.
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the identity of the face, or on the hair color. In
the first case the response to a face would
remain as it was in the training stages, in the
latter it changes into what is appropriate for
faces with its new hair color. Responses
appropriate for faces with the new hair color
will be called ‘‘hair color responses’’, and were
the central dependent variable. The feature-
salience account predicts hair color responses
on changed faces in the experimental condi-
tion, but not in the control condition. The
associative-mediation account predicts no hair
color responses in either condition for
changed face stimuli. If hair color is the
dominant feature regardless of equivalence
training, changed face stimuli should generate
hair color responses in both conditions.
Table 2 gives the number of participants
that gave 0, 1 or 2 ‘‘hair color’’ responses for
changed faces. In the control condition,
participants tended to ignore hair color and
instead responded by treating the changed
face in the same way as the trained face from
which it was derived. This result confirms that
hair color was not so salient as to swamp all
other features, and is consistent with the
predictions of both the feature-salience and
associative-mediation accounts. Table 2 shows
a very similar pattern of behavior for the
experimental condition: Most subjects classi-
fied the changed face not by hair color but by
the face from which it was derived. In other
words, even though these subjects had previ-
ously learned to treat faces with the same hair
color as equivalent, this single diagnostic
feature was not enough to determine how a
changed face would be classified. There was no
difference between the patterns of responding
to changed faces in the experimental and
control conditions, x2(1) 5 0.19, p . .5 one-
tailed. Taking both conditions together, fewer
participants responded based on hair color to
the changed faces than based on face identity,
x2(1) 5 3.13, p 5 .04, one-tailed.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 3 go counter to
the feature salience account. When the diag-
nostic feature that determines equivalence
classes (i.e., hair color) was changed, the
responses to the stimulus followed the equiv-
alence class in most participants, not the new
single-feature change. This shows at least that
attention paid to the diagnostic feature did
not outweigh associations to the stimulus as a
whole. A caveat is that in the Fish task, there
are two stimuli in each stimulus class. It is
possible that feature salience does play a role
when larger stimulus classes are used. With
larger stimulus classes, shared features and not
individual stimuli may become the basis for
associations with outcomes.
The results are consistent with the associa-
tive mediation account. They are not strong
evidence for it, however, as in both conditions
a minority of participants responded in line
with the hair color feature, and not face
identity. This is unsurprising insofar as a
trained face with changed hair color is a
degraded version of the trained stimulus and,
as such, would be expected to be less able to
retrieve the consequent associated with the
original face. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that
the associative mediation account is supported
more by the elimination of a rival explanation
than by confirmation of its prediction.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In acquired equivalence, two or more
stimuli become functionally equivalent
through pairing with the same outcome.
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that such
equivalence training can alter the way stimuli
are stored in memory. The training made
equivalent faces more similar and therefore
more confusable, as shown by the pattern of
errors in an associative recognition test.
Experiment 3 showed that representational
change is more likely to take the form of
mediated associations (Hall et al., 2003) than
Table 2
Number of Experiment 3 participants whose responses to
the face with changed hair color were based on either face
identity or hair color.
Experimental
condition
Control
condition
all responses based on face
identity 10 11
mixed responding 4 4
all responses based on hair color 6 5
Note. The feature-salience account predicts hair color
responses in the experimental condition, the associative-
mediation account predicts identity responses in both
conditions.
138 M. MEETER et al.
of an increased attention to and reliance on
diagnostic features.
By showing that acquired equivalence train-
ing influences the formation of episodic
memories, our findings suggest that acquired
equivalence training and episodic memory rely
on overlapping memory systems. Gluck and
Myers (2001; also see Hodder, Gearge, Kill-
cross, & Honey, 2003; Myers & Gluck, 1996)
proposed that such representational modifica-
tions might occur in the hippocampal region.
Specifically, representations might be changed
to increase generalization between stimuli
that co-occur or are paired with the same
outcome (consequent). Prior work showed
that humans with hippocampal atrophy are
able to learn the initial face–fish mappings,
and are able to continue to respond correctly
to trained pairs at test, but are impaired at the
novel pairs in a transfer test—failing to
generalize and pair A2 with X2 and B2 with
Y2 (Myers et al., 2003). Functional neuroim-
aging (fMRI) studies have also documented
hippocampal region activation while healthy
adult humans learn a similar task (Preston,
Shrager, Dudukovic, & Gabrieli, 2004). Sim-
ilarly, rats with entorhinal cortex lesions are
disrupted at acquired equivalence (Cou-
tureau, Killcross, Good, Marshall, Ward-Ro-
binson, & Honey, 2002), although the same
authors found that lesions to the hippocam-
pus proper did not impair acquired equiva-
lence. The fact that our current findings show
interactions between equivalence training
and episodic memory, usually presumed to
rely on the hippocampal region, adds to the
body of evidence implicating the hippocam-
pal region in acquired equivalence.
On the other hand, our results from
Experiment 3 contrast with the results of
Bonardi et al. (2005), who found that equiv-
alence training has much stronger effects
when equivalent stimuli share a clear feature
than when they do not. Whereas we found
little evidence that individual features deter-
mined generalization, Bonardi et al. found
that a shared feature facilitates equivalence
training. However, the fact that such shared
features facilitate acquired equivalence does
not necessarily imply that acquired equiva-
lence depends on such shared features. It is
only the latter idea that was disconfirmed in
Experiment 3. Our results are consistent with
those of Goyos (2000). He had children
identity-match eight stimuli. Correct choices
were rewarded with beads of one color for four
stimuli, and beads of another color for the
other four stimuli. In two experiments, he
found that most children who participated
would spontaneously name the colors while
learning new discriminations involving the
stimuli. Those that did not showed no gener-
alization in responding in a transfer test. When
taught to name the bead colors during extra
training, transfer was normal. This suggests
that the verbal labels mediated transfer of
function, consistent with the associative-medi-
ation account (although Goyos himself did not
interpret his results in such terms).
In summary, the current experiments sug-
gest that equivalence training changes the
representations of the stimuli involved. Added
associations make equivalent stimuli more
similar, and therefore more easily confusable.
Moreover, they allow responses learned to one
stimulus to generalize to other stimuli.
This view is not very different from how
exemplar-based models view performance in
categorization tasks (e.g., Nosofsky, 1988;
Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Shiffrin, 2003).
These models assume that category assign-
ments are stored in the memory representa-
tions of stimuli, one of which is stored for each
trial. This is equivalent to the creation of an
association, assumed by associative mediation,
between the stimulus and the outcome or
response. Then, at test, presentation of the
stimulus evokes retrieval of stimulus represen-
tations from memory, and a response is given
based on the category assignment stored in the
retrieved representations. What would an
exemplar model of a standard acquired
equivalence task look like? First, stimuli A1
and A2 are coupled to response X1, leading
response X1 to be incorporated in, or linked
to, memory representations of A1 and A2.
Then, A1 is coupled with response X2, and so
X2 is incorporated in or linked to the
representation of A1. What would now happen
if A2 were to be presented, and a choice given
between response X2 and a different response,
say Z? Retrieving stimulus A2 would also
retrieve response X1, which leads to the
retrieval of representations of A1, which in
turn leads to retrieval of X2. Unless a
representation of the alternative response Z
is similarly activated, A2 will evoke X2—just as
observed in an acquired equivalence study.
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Whether or not such an account would be an
improvement over a purely associative account
of acquired equivalence remains an issue for
further study.
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